tf_code/packages/opencode/test/file/path-traversal.test.ts

import { test, expect, describe } from "bun:test"
import path from "path"
import { Filesystem } from "../../src/util/filesystem"
import { File } from "../../src/file"
import { Instance } from "../../src/project/instance"
import { tmpdir } from "../fixture/fixture"

describe("Filesystem.contains", () => {
  test("allows paths within project", () => {
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/project/src")).toBe(true)
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/project/src/file.ts")).toBe(true)
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/project")).toBe(true)
  })

  test("blocks ../ traversal", () => {
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/project/../etc")).toBe(false)
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/project/src/../../etc")).toBe(false)
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/etc/passwd")).toBe(false)
  })

  test("blocks absolute paths outside project", () => {
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/etc/passwd")).toBe(false)
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/tmp/file")).toBe(false)
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/home/user/project", "/home/user/other")).toBe(false)
  })

  test("handles prefix collision edge cases", () => {
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/project-other/file")).toBe(false)
    expect(Filesystem.contains("/project", "/projectfile")).toBe(false)
  })
})

/*
 * Integration tests for File.read() and File.list() path traversal protection.
 *
 * These tests verify the HTTP API code path is protected. The HTTP endpoints
 * in server.ts (GET /file/content, GET /file) call File.read()/File.list()
 * directly - they do NOT go through ReadTool or the agent permission layer.
 *
 * This is a SEPARATE code path from ReadTool, which has its own checks.
 */
describe("File.read path traversal protection", () => {
  test("rejects ../ traversal attempting to read /etc/passwd", async () => {
    await using tmp = await tmpdir({
      init: async (dir) => {
        await Bun.write(path.join(dir, "allowed.txt"), "allowed content")
      },
    })

    await Instance.provide({
      directory: tmp.path,
      fn: async () => {
        await expect(File.read("../../../etc/passwd")).rejects.toThrow("Access denied: path escapes project directory")
      },
    })
  })

  test("rejects deeply nested traversal", async () => {
    await using tmp = await tmpdir()

    await Instance.provide({
      directory: tmp.path,
      fn: async () => {
        await expect(File.read("src/nested/../../../../../../../etc/passwd")).rejects.toThrow(
          "Access denied: path escapes project directory",
        )
      },
    })
  })

  test("allows valid paths within project", async () => {
    await using tmp = await tmpdir({
      init: async (dir) => {
        await Bun.write(path.join(dir, "valid.txt"), "valid content")
      },
    })

    await Instance.provide({
      directory: tmp.path,
      fn: async () => {
        const result = await File.read("valid.txt")
        expect(result.content).toBe("valid content")
      },
    })
  })
})

describe("File.list path traversal protection", () => {
  test("rejects ../ traversal attempting to list /etc", async () => {
    await using tmp = await tmpdir()

    await Instance.provide({
      directory: tmp.path,
      fn: async () => {
        await expect(File.list("../../../etc")).rejects.toThrow("Access denied: path escapes project directory")
      },
    })
  })

  test("allows valid subdirectory listing", async () => {
    await using tmp = await tmpdir({
      init: async (dir) => {
        await Bun.write(path.join(dir, "subdir", "file.txt"), "content")
      },
    })

    await Instance.provide({
      directory: tmp.path,
      fn: async () => {
        const result = await File.list("subdir")
        expect(Array.isArray(result)).toBe(true)
      },
    })
  })
})